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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is established by the Constitution of the State
of Utah pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 and pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2) (d) , which confers upon the Court of Appeals
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue #1:
Did the trial court err in holding that Appellant Lawrence
entered into an attorney-client relationship with Ward by endorsing
a personal injury settlement check, depositing it into his trust
account, and disbursing the proceeds?
Standard of Review:

The Court of Appeals reviews mixed

questions of law and fact in relation to professional malpractice
by the abuse of discretion standard.

Mixed questions of law and

fact do not warrant the deference that is due findings of questions
of pure fact.

Margulies ex rel. Maraulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d

1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985).
Issue #2:
Did the trial court err in holding that Lawrence had a duty to
third parties claiming an interest in the proceeds of the personal
injury action?
Standard of Review:

The Court of Appeals reviews mixed

questions of law and fact in relation to professional malpractice
by the abuse of discretion standard.

Mixed questions of law and

fact do not warrant the deference that is due findings of questions
1

of pure fact.

Maraulies ex rel. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d

1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985).
Issue #3:
Did the trial court err in denying Lawrence's motion to
dismiss or for a directed verdict based on an Assignment of
Benefits and Doctor's Lien executed by Ward?
Standard of Review:

Questions of fact are reviewed by the

Court of Appeals under the clearly erroneous standard.

Doelle v.

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 1.13 Safekeeping Property.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which
a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to
receive and, upon request by the client or third person,
shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property.
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Burns, a chiropractic physician, brought this action
against

the

Defendants

Lawrence

and

Summerhays,

attorneys

representing John L. Ward, for payment of money received by
Defendants, but belonging to Dr. Burns.

Summerhays represented

Ward in a personal injury action which resulted in a settlement and
recovery

from an

insurance

company.
2

The proceeds

from the

:i i ISUI ai ice sett] ement wer e del iver ed to 1 <awr ence for distribution.
Lawrence distributed the proceeds to Summerhays and Ward, receiving
for hi m S elf . Thereafter, Ward f :I ] ed bankr i iptc}r, 1 :i sti i lg D: :

none

Burns as a creditor and seeking to discharge this obligation

Dr

Burns sued Summerhays and Lawrence to recover for his medical
ser " : *~- '

1 :

~ * :" "

4m

•
* *~ha}rs and I jav\

After the commencement of 1 ne rriai
se111 ed

t h e :i r

dismissed,
r

>

aiscLibaLiiig -he proceeds without satisfying his claim.

him .

The

e I: :i read: .:-.;..-:.

rifl'

I

ci:i s p u t e

:*

and

Burns and Summerhays
* . ns t

Si irnnie r hay s

was

Summerhays, however, testified as a witness at trial.
* ~v. ' found that Lawrence wrongful!;r distributed the
i isui : ai ice proceeds and awarded Dr Burns a judgment

against Lawrence.
Immed i a t e 1 y up on the e n t r y o f t: h e j i ldgme n t:, I , aw r e n c e f i ] e d
this appeal before the Utah Court- of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1

Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990.

R. 197, 367.

2 • l'c nsi ire pa,} orient, W a r d e x e c u t e d a n as si g n m e n t of bei lef i ts
and P doctor's lien in favor of Dr. Burns.
documents were prepared by Dr. Burns' office.
w o ii 1 < ^ i i < > i • "'I t ^1;;r < :" z o 111: i n u e d p r o v :i d :i n g
receive r::;

coctor's

lien

3

.

i •. •-

of Summerhays' office staff.

R. 197.

3

These

R. 368. DT Burns

t r e a t in e i I t: s t: o W a i:!

and assignment

proceeds of the personal injury action.

R. 197

of benefits

R 369.

on the

•

.

4.

Late in 1991, the personal injury action of Ward was

settled.

Summerhays negotiated the settlement with the insurance

company and instructed the insurance company to make a check
payable to Lawrence and Ward.
5.

In

Summerhays.

September,

R. 198.

1991, Lawrence

initiated

a

call

to

Summerhays and Lawrence discussed the value of Ward's

personal injury claim. Summerhays told Lawrence that Dr. Burns had
a lien against the settlement proceeds and informed Lawrence of
Summerhays' attorney's fees.
6.

In December, 1991, Lawrence, Summerhays, and Ward met in

Lawrence's office.
379.

R. 198.

The meeting was arranged by Summerhays.

R.

At that meeting, Lawrence and Ward endorsed the settlement

check.

R. 198.

7.

Summerhays instructed Lawrence and Ward to endorse the

settlement check and instructed Lawrence to deposit that check. R.
381.

After the check cleared, Summerhays instructed Lawrence to

distribute the proceeds of the settlement, 3 8 percent to Summerhays
and the balance to Ward.
8.

R. 198.

The insurance check was issued as full settlement of

Ward's personal injury claim.
9.
Lawrence

In compliance with
deposited

the

R. 198, 387.
the instructions

checks

into

his

distributed the sums to Ward and Summerhays.
10.

of Summerhays,

trust

account

and

R. 198, 3 84, 391.

Dr. Burns was never been paid on the lien or claim which

he had against the proceeds of Ward's personal injury action.
198.
4

R.

11.

A 1 thougl i I iawrence

endorsed

t:I le

sett 1 eiiieiit:

^hec] :

deposited it in his trust account,, and disbursed the proceeds of
the personal injury settlement, he received no compensation from
,

V • *
12.
on

*,

R

,

Lawrence d i d not: discover whether third parties' claims

che oersona

:; • •. rr-

proceeds

were

satd sf i ed. "

know! ^aq-:: .. ' ..e claim .ii;.: 1 i pn of Dr. Burns.

R

199.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The rinal court correctly concluded that Lawrence's acts of
::i t::ii :i ig,

and

d i strd bi ltd i lg

end:' '-"*::

:•

tl le

established

in attorney-client relationship with Ward.

Regardless

of whether Lawrence h a d an attorney-client relationship with Ward,
as

ai I at tor nej

property he received.

-

whose

Lawrence breached that duty by distributing

the funds without' satisfying the assignment and lien of D r . Burns.
Lawrence

fall:-; I n . ippropr lately

inai i/,ha I 1 I h^ evidence

to

attack the factual findings and the reasonable inferences from the
factual findings w h i c h were determined b y the trial court.
trial

• :: o i 11: t s i: e f u s a 1

to

d i s m :i s s 1) i:

sustained.
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B u i: n s c 1 a i m

The
s h o u 1 d be

ARGUMENT
POINT I
LAWRENCE BREACHED HIS DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES
WHEN HE FAILED TO DISTRIBUTE THE PERSONAL INJURY
PROCEEDS TO THE ASSIGNEE AND LIEN HOLDER, DR. BURNS
Dr. Burns treated Ward for injuries in May, 1990.
367.

R. 197,

In exchange for the medical services, Ward granted Dr. Burns

a doctor's lien and assignment of benefits on the proceeds of his
personal injury action.

R. 197.

Ward was represented in his

personal injury action by Summerhays, an attorney with 32 years of
experience in the practice of law.

R. 337-38.

When the case was

about to settle, Summerhays contacted the insurance company and
instructed it to make the settlement check payable to Lawrence and
Ward.

R. 197.

Lawrence was an attorney with whom Ward had

previously consulted. R. 375. Summerhays informed Lawrence of Dr.
Burns' lien. R. 198. Summerhays scheduled a meeting between Ward,
Lawrence and Summerhays, which took place in December, 1991.

R.

339. At that meeting, the settlement check of $6,500 was endorsed
by Ward and Lawrence, deposited into Lawrence's trust account, and
after the funds had cleared, distributed in its entirety to Ward
and Summerhays by Lawrence.

R. 198, Addendum "E".

Dr. Burns' claim is based on Lawrence's breach of duty to
distribute funds to the third party owner. Dr. Burns claimed that
an attorney who received his client's personal injury proceeds must
exercise due diligence to discover and satisfy third-party claims
on those proceeds.

Dr. Burns presented James B. Lee, Attorney at

Law, to establish the standard of care for distributing personal
6

injury proceeds

Lee testified that an attorney has a duty ' o

determine the existence of third-party claims against personal
injury proceeds and to satisfy them
malpractice..

219-2(

Rules of P.- Dfessiona"
for attorneys.
standard

He

The breach of that duty is

Lee also referred to Rule 1.13 . :f the

* • .:.

!

as evii dence of the standard t ' -.ire

;^;i:r:^d that the Rules do not establish the

: care, ";;ut they are evidence of the standard of care.

R. 22
Rule 1.13 Safekeeping Property.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which
a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to
receive and, upon request by the client or third person,
shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property.
Rules of Prof ess iona ] Condi ict • Ri lie 1 1 3 . The Commei it to tl le Rule
states that a lawyer should hold property of others with the care
required

of

a professional

fiduciary.

As

if

addressing

the

circumstances of this case the Comment states:
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may
have just claims against funds or other property in a
lawyers custody.
A lawyer may have a duty under
applicable law to protect such third-party claims against
wrongful interference by the client and accordingly may
refuse to surrender the property to the client.
Rules i

Professional Conduct. Rule

Comment.

The trial court held that in light of the standard of care
established by Lee and reflected in Rule 1.13, Lawrence breached

7

the standard of care and his duty to Dr. Burns by failing to
satisfy Dr. Burns' lien and assignment.
A.

LAWRENCE'S ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ESTABLISHED AN ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
Lawrence asserts that he did not represent Ward, and since

there

was

no

representation,

there

representation imposed upon him.

could

be

no

duties

of

The Utah Court of Appeals has

described the attorney-client relationship as follows:
In general, except where an attorney is appointed by
a court, the attorney-client relationship is created by
contract. . . . The contract may be express or implied
from the conduct of the parties. . . . The relationship
is proved by showing that the party seeks and receives
the advice of the lawyer in matters pertinent to the
lawyer's profession. . . . Such a showing is subjective
in that a factor in evaluating the relationship is
whether
the
client
thought
an
attorney-client
relationship existed. . . . However, a party's belief
that an attorney-client relationship exists, unless
reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the
attorney, is not sufficient to create a confidential
attorney-client relationship. . . . In sum, "it is the
intent and conduct of the parties which is critical to
the formation of the attorney-client relationship."
[Citations omitted]
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990) .
The conduct of Ward and Lawrence, by endorsing, depositing, and
distributing the proceeds of the settlement check, establishes the
existence of an attorney-client relationship. If Lawrence were not
an attorney, would the insurance company have placed his name on
the check settling all claims?
would

Ward

have

entrusted

Lawrence's trust account?

If Lawrence were not an attorney,
the

personal

injury

proceeds

to

If Lawrence were not an attorney, would

Lawrence have distributed the proceeds of the personal injury
8

settlement check to Ward and Summerhays pursuant to instructions?
Only because Lawrence was an attorney was the insurance company
willing to draw the check in his name, allowing him to effectuate
the final settlement of the personal injury action.

Only because

Lawrence was an attorney was he entrusted with the funds and
authorized by Ward to distribute them.
Similar to the determination of Utah law about the nature of
attorney-client

relationship,

the

Supreme

Court

of

Iowa

in

Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977), stated:
An attorney-client relationship ordinarily rests on
contract, but it is not necessary that the contract be
express or that a retainer be requested or paid. The
contract may be implied from conduct of the parties.
. . The relationship is created when (1) a person seeks
advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or
assistance sought pertains to matters within the
attorney's professional competence, and (3) the attorney
expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives
the desired advice or assistance.
. . . [Citations
omitted]
An attorney-client relationship was established between Ward and
Lawrence based on the assistance Ward received from Lawrence.
Summerhays

and

Ward

gave

Lawrence

the

settlement

check and

requested that Lawrence deposit the check and distribute the funds.
Lawrence and Summerhays had already discussed Dr. Burns' doctor's
lien, R. 197, and Ward's refusal to pay the doctor's bill. R. 385.
Ward and Summerhays met with Lawrence, seeking his assistance to
deposit and distribute the proceeds of the personal injury action.
R. 381.

Lawrence agreed to deposit the check, but refused to

distribute the proceeds until the check had cleared, thus assuring
that the funds were actually available.
9

R. 408.

Furthermore,

Lawrence actually provided the desired assistance to Ward by
depositing and distributing those funds to Ward and Summerhays. R.
409.

Lawrence entered into an attorney-client relationship with

Ward by depositing the funds, acting as a fiduciary entrusted with
those funds, and then distributing those funds.
Lawrence asserts that if no attorney-client
exists, he has no duty to Dr. Burns.
Burns

whether

or

not

relationship with Ward.

he

was

relationship

But Lawrence had a duty to

engaged

in

an

attorney-client

As an attorney, Lawrence has a duty to

manage third parties' funds which come into his possession.

This

duty is not contingent upon the existence of an attorney-client
relationship.

His duty is to preserve the funds and use due

diligence to determine ownership.

If a dispute arises, he should

interplead the funds into court.
The common law establishes that lawyers who receive property
belonging to third parties are liable for its appropriate delivery.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d
1073

(1935) , held that an attorney who delivered funds to his

client, despite knowing of his client's valid agreement to give
one-third of the proceeds to a third party, was liable to the third
party for the one-third share.

The Court stated:

This court has held that where a person receives funds
knowing that they belong to another, he thereby becomes
responsible for their payment to the owner, even though
he received them from a third person and there is no
contractual relation between him and the owner. See
Yourt v. McKee, 1 Utah 281; . . . .
Id. at 1076.

Lawrence had the duty to pay Dr. Burns, even when

there was no attorney-client contract or relationship.
10

The Idaho Court of Appeals ruled in Bonanza Motors Inc. v.
Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d 1102 (Idaho App. 1983), that where a
client assigned a creditor an interest in the proceeds from an
action, and the assignment directed the law firm to pay directly to
the creditor, the creditor had a cause of action against the
attorney who paid the entire recovery to the client pursuant to the
client's request.

The client negotiated the attorney's draft

without paying the creditor.

The creditor sued on the assignment

and obtained a summary judgment against the law firm.
The New York Supreme Court has also held that an attorney with
notice of an assignment of proceeds from a personal injury action
by his client to a physician was liable to the physician for paying
the

settlement

proceeds

to

the

client

in disregard

of the

assignment. The Court stated: "It is undisputed that the Defendant
[attorney] . . . had notice of the assignment to Plaintiff, for
medical services rendered, of a portion of the proceeds of his
client's claim for personal injuries. Consequently, in paying out
monies in disregard of such assignment, he is liable to Plaintiff
for the resulting damage." Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950,
238 N.Y.S.2d 876, 876-77 (1962).
Even if Lawrence did not have an attorney-client relationship
with Ward, he nevertheless had the obligation to deliver the
property to its proper owner.

This is fundamental law and common

sense for both attorneys and non-attorneys.

11

B.

PAYMENT OF A FEE, OR LACK OF PAYMENT, DOES NOT DESTROY THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
Lawrence asserts that he had no attorney-client relationship

with Ward because he received no payment for services.
payment

of

a

fee

may

be

an

indicia

of

the

While

attorney-client

relationship, it is not required to establish such a relationship.
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated:
. . . the payment of attorney fees does not by itself
determine whether an attorney-client relationship exists,
but is only one indicia. Hecht ["v. Superior Court, 192
Cal. App. 3d 560,] 237 Cal. Rptr. [528] at 530; see also
Huddleston v. State, 259 Ga. 45, 376 S.E.2d 683, 684
(1989) (although the general test of employment is the
fee, the basic question with regard to an attorney-client
relationship is whether advice or assistance of the
attorney is both sought and received).
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 728 (Utah App. 1990) .
Since Lawrence's assistance in depositing and distributing the
personal injury proceeds was received by Ward, regardless of a fee,
the attorney-client relationship was established.
C.

THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT MAY BE UTILIZED TO
ESTABLISH THE STANDARD OF CARE
Lawrence objects to the use of the Rules of Professional

Conduct to establish the standard of care of attorneys claiming
that the Rules specifically deny a private cause of action arising
from the violation of any of its provisions.

This issue was

specifically addressed in Waldman v. Levine. 544 A.2d 683 (D.C.
App. 1988) :
Appellants further object to the trial court's
admission of [expert] testimony that he had considered
various
provisions
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers in determining what was the
appropriate standard of care for an attorney in
12

appellants' circumstances.
Appellants contend that
because the Code provides no private cause of action for
its violation, any testimony about it was both irrelevant
to appellants' liability for negligence and extremely
prejudicial.
Although it may be true that the Code provides no
private cause of action for its violation, . . . a
question we need not decide, the issue is whether the
standards set by the Code are relevant to establishing
the standard of care governing an attorney's conduct. A
number of courts have held that although the Code does
not attempt to delineate the boundaries of civil
liability for the professional conduct of attorneys, its
provisions constitute some evidence of the standards
required of lawyers. See, Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d
924, 936 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101
S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 114 (1980); Menzel v. Morse, 362
N.W.2d. 465, 471 (Iowa 1985) (Code is evidence of
requisite skill and knowledge of member of legal
profession)(dictum); Martinson Bros, v. Hiellum, 359
N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D.1985)(Code violations constitute
rebuttable evidence of legal malpractice) / see also. Van
Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641, 645 n. 1 (Alaska
1981) (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
Other courts,
although not faced with the precise issue presented here,
looked to the Code for guidance on the proper standard of
conduct for attorneys. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App.
2d 136, 146-47, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968); Ishmael v.
Millinaton, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526-27, 50 Cal. Rptr.
592, 595-96 (1966); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock,
23 Md. App. 280, 302, 327 A.2d 891, 904-05 & n. 10
(1974) ; Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 93-98, 538
P.2d 1238, 1249-51 (1975) (disciplinary rules have status
of rule of court).
It is an obvious proposition that the Code of
Professional Conduct, provides a gauge by which to
determine the competency of the Bar. See, Preamble and
Preliminary
Statement
to
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility, D.C. Court Rules Annotated (1987)
Appendix A, at 133-34. See also D.R. 6-101 (A) (1) & (2)
(lawyer shall not handle legal matter which he knows he
is not competent to handle or undertake representation
without preparation adequate in the circumstances). A
legal expert's use of the Code in determining the
standard of care required in a legal malpractice case is
not unlike the use of practice codes in other negligence
contexts. [Citations omitted].

13

Id at 690-91.

James Lee testified that based on his experience as

president and chairmen of the board of Parsons Behle & Latimer for
15 years, member of the State committee to review the Rules of
Professional

Conduct

before

their

implementation,

State

Bar

President, ten year member of the three person committee at Parsons
Behle & Latimer which reviews ethical problems, malpractice, and
professional conduct for the 102 lawyer firm, he could render an
opinion on the standard of care owed by attorneys to their clients
and third parties. R. 214-15. Mr. Lee testified that he believed
that the Rules of Professional Conduct "provide evidence" of what
the standard of care should be.

R. 221-22.

The Rules of

Professional Conduct may not be the basis for civil liability, but
they may appropriately be used as evidence of an attorney's
standard of care.
Lawrence

also

claims

that

Rule

1.13

of

the

Rules

of

Professional Conduct was "dispositive" in establishing his duty to
third parties.

This, however, is not the case.

James Lee

testified that his knowledge of the standard of care was based on
a career of service and experience with professional ethics.

In

addition, the common law, far before the Rules of Professional
Conduct, required an attorney who received funds belonging to a
third party to deliver those funds to the third party, or be liable
to the third party.

See, Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d

1073 (1935); Bonanza Motors Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 657 P.2d
1102 (Idaho App. 1983) ;
238 N.Y.S.2d

Brinkman v. Moskowitz, 38 Misc. 2d 950,

876, 876-77

(1962).
14

The standard of care is,

therefore,
experience

derived
in

from many

the

industry,

sources,
and

including

published

common law,

standards

and

requirements. To characterized the trial court's use of the Rules
of Professional Conduct in determining the standard of care as
"dispositive", ignores the breadth of experience and understanding
of the standard of care established in the testimony.
POINT II
LAWRENCE'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT WAS PROPERLY DENIED
Lawrence asserts that his motion to dismiss or for a directed
verdict was improperly denied by the trial court.

He claims that

there was no evidence in the record establishing that the holder of
the lien, Spine Institute of Utah, was the same as the Plaintiff,
Dr. Burns. With no analysis or legal support, Lawrence claims that
the trial court "ignored the clear weight of the evidence" and that
11

[t] here is absolutely no place in the record below showing that

Appellee

[Burns]

is

in

fact

'Spine

Institute',

or has any

assignment from Spine Institute, or any right to maintain the
lawsuit in the Spine Institute's behalf."
11.

Brief of Appellant, p.

Despite these contentions, Lawrence fails to meet his burden

to establish that the trial court should be reversed.

To prevail

on this issue, Lawrence must establish that the findings of the
trial court were "clearly erroneous". This Lawrence has failed to
do.

He fails to marshal the evidence to justify his petition for

reversal.

15

The Court of Appeals has delineated how appellants must attack
the trial court's findings of fact.

In West Valley City v.

Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), the
Utah Court of Appeals stated:
In order to successfully challenge the trial court's
decision, where it is premised on factual interpretation
. . . , the [appellant] must begin by undertaking the
arduous and painstaking marshalling process. . . . After
marshalling the evidence supporting the trial court's
finding, the [appellant] must then show that these same
findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them clearly
erroneous." Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neil, 783
P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
The marshalling process is not unlike
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate
himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the duty of marshalling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
the trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a
fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that
the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous.
"Appellants often overlook or disregard this heavy
burden." Jd.
In the present case, appellant has
acknowledged the requirement but mis-perceived it. See
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464
(Utah App. 1991) . As in Heinecke, the [appellant] has
presented a general catalogue of evidence. What the
[appellant] has not done is to correlate particular items
of evidence with the challenged findings and convince us
of the Court's missteps in application of the evidence to
its findings. The findings, then, have not been shown to
be clearly erroneous.
In the instant appeal, the
challenge to the legal conclusions rises and falls with
the
factual
findings
sought
to be challenged.
Accordingly, we leave undisturbed the Court's findings
and conclusions based thereon.

16

,

West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991) . See also, Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah
1989); Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986); Schindler v.
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court held that " . . . any substantial
evidence [in the record] will support the findings and judgement"
[emphasis added] .
1975) .

Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah

Any substantial evidence supporting the findings in the

judgment satisfies the "clear weight of the evidence" test and such
findings and judgment are not "clearly erroneous."
Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980).

Nielsen v.

"Any substantial

evidence" is satisfied unless there is no reasonable basis for the
findings.

Id.

Therefore, the duty of the court of appeals relating to an
attack on the facts is:
. . . to follow the cardinal rules of review; to
indulge [the facts found by the trial court] a
presumption of validity and correctness; to require the
appellant to sustain the burden of showing error; to
review the record in the light most favorable to them;
and not to disturb them if they find substantial support
in the evidence.
Charleston v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2nd 1176 (1961).
Lawrence

has

failed

to

correlate

particular

items

of

supportive evidence with the challenged findings to expose the
trial court's missteps in the application of the evidence to its
findings.

The findings, then, have not been shown to be clearly

erroneous.
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Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the
findings and ruling denying the motion to dismiss or for a directed
verdict. Dr. Burns treated Ward, had him sign a doctor's lien and
Assignment of Benefits to protect his interest, R. 197, 332, and
had contact with Summerhays in relation to the personal injury
action.

R. 362.

Dr. Burns' name appears at the top of the

Doctor's Lien document. Addendum "C". The Spine Institute of Utah
is not designated as a separate or independent entity from Dr.
Burns and as a d/b/a of Dr. Burns, Dr. Burns is personally entitled
to enforce any agreements made with his patients despite the use of
an assumed name.
Furthermore, Lawrence does not attack the Assignment of
Benefits which was executed by Ward and is a basis for Dr. Burns'
claim against the proceeds of Ward's personal injury action.
Assignment of Benefits, Addendum

The

"D", is in the name of the

Plaintiff, "Brian D. Burns, D.C., d/b/a Burns Chiropractic Clinic."
and assigns the recovery from any action to Dr. Burns to the extent
of his medical bills.

It also provides for a lien against the

recovery in personal injury actions. Since Dr. Burn's claim to the
proceeds of Ward's personal injury action was established for and
in the name of Dr. Burns in both the Doctor's Lien and Assignment
of Benefits, the record contains substantial support for the
findings of the trial court and the motion to dismiss or for
directed verdict was properly denied.
Since Lawrence fails to marshall the evidence, the Court of
Appeals should uphold the factual findings of the trial court and
18

affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss and for a
directed verdict.

"We have shown no reluctance to affirm when the

appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence."

West Valley

City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App.
1991).
CONCLUSION
The rulings of the trial court, in finding that Lawrence had
an attorney-client relationship with Ward and that the Rules of
Professional Conduct may be utilized as evidence of the standard of
attorney

care,

are

justified

under

any

standard

of review.

Delivery of the personal injury settlement check to Lawrence was an
attempt to circumvent the obligation to pay Dr. Burns his fees for
medical services, secured by the Doctor's lien and the Assignment
of Benefits.
Lawrence has failed to marshall the evidence to establish that
the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss or for a directed
verdict should be reversed.

Without proper marshalling of the

evidence,

reversal.

there

can

be

no

The

record

contains

substantial evidence justifying the trial court's denial of the
motion. The Spine Institute is not shown to be an entity separate
from Dr. Burns personally.

In addition, the Assignment of

Benefits, which is not attacked by Lawrence, grants Dr. Burns an
interest in the proceeds of the personal injury recovery and a
doctor's lien in those proceeds.
The trial court was justified in its rulings and its judgment
should be affirmed.
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DATED this

#15^

day of March, 1996.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
brief was hand delivered to the following on this
March, 1996:
Victor Lawrence, Esq.
Attorney at Law
10 West Broadway, Suite 211
Salt Lake City, Utah^ 84101
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Addendum A

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

O^i l.V^K)^,

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C. d/b/a
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,

AMENDFD FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
V.

LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and
VICTOR LAWRENCE

Civil No.
:

930004651 CV

Judge Reece

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the
Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial setting in the
above-entitled matter. Testimony was received by the Court on May
15, 1995, and again on August 15, 1995. The court having reviewed
the files and records herein, having received the testimony of the
witnesses, having received the arguments of counsel and for good
cause appearing, therefore does hereby issue the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Dr. Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990.

2.

To insure payment, Dr. Burns received an assignment of

benefits and a doctor's lien from Mr. Ward.
3.

The lien was signed by Mr. Ward and by Mr. Summerhays or

some member of Mr. Summerhays' office staff.
4.

Late in 1991, the personal injury action o- Mr. Ward was

settled.

Mr. Summerhays negotiated that settlement with the

insurance company and instructed the insurance company to make a
check payable to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward.
5.

In September, 1991, Mr. Lawrence initiated a call to Mr.

Summerhays. Mr. Summerhays and Mr. Lawrence discussed the value of
the personal injury claim of Mr. Ward.

Mr. Summerhays told Mr.

Lawrence that Dr. Burns had a lien against the settlement proceeds
and informed Mr. Lawrence of Mr. Summerhays' attorney's fees.
6.

In December, 1991, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Summerhays, and Mr.

Ward met in Lawrence's office.
Summerhays.

The meeting was arranged by Mr.

At that meeting, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward endorsed

the settlement check.
7.

Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward to

endorse the settlement check and instructed Mr. Lawrence to deposit
that check. After the check cleared, Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr.
Lawrence to distribute the proceeds of the settlement, 3 8 percent
to Mr. Summerhays and the balance to Mr. Ward.
8.

The insurance check was issued as full settlement of the

personal injury claim of Mr. Ward.
9. In compliance with the instructions of Mr. Summerhays, Mr.
Lawrence

deposited

the

checks

into

his

trust

account

and

distributed the sums to Mr. Ward and Mr. Summerhays.
10.

Dr. Burns has never been paid on the lien or claim which

he had against the proceeds of the personal injury action of Mr.
Ward.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. When Mr. Lawrence endorsed the settlement check, deposited

.-.''

this

fS

v. \

u

V

,

day of Qctol5e^r'i995\

A

/? / r ^ ^ * ft

iiBytthe ,Courts :
**

'I

\ zrv — - ••..*-.. .1 %

Rob:3fc3g£L&<3gge, Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that i caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing tcj victor Lawrence, 10 West Broadway Suite 311,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this
October, 1995.

IQ

day of

Addendum B

Judgment

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
BRIAN D. BURNS B.C. d/b/a
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,
Plaintiff,

:

JUDGMENT

:

v.
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and
VICTOR LAWRENCE

:

Civil No. ^ 0 0 0 4 6 5 1 CV

Judge Jfeege
Defendants.
The

above-entitled

:
matter

canTe on regularly

before the

Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial had in this
matter, the Court having reviewed the files and records lerein,
having received the testimony of the witnesses, having received the
arguments

of

counsel,

having

reviewed

the

legal

au-hority

presented, and for good cause appearing, therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be

entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of
$2,060.00, plus prejudgment interest of $858.33, plus costs of
$74.00, for a total judgment of $2,992.33, plus post-judgment
interest to accrue at the legal rate of 9.22 percent per annum.

DATED t h i s

2L

c a y of

September,
By t h e /Courpr

'

Robin\Wc> R e e ^ e ,

Judge

V<?"
MAILING CERTIFICATED.
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, this
day of September, 1995:
Victor Lawrence
Att ^rney at Law
10 West Broadway, Suite 311
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

&

Addendum C

Medical Reports and Doctor's Lien

Spine Institute of Utah
B**NBUMS. DC.

ROBEOT^WOJMOttJ M 0.

CWW0WWC7IC WV8/C/AK

0KIHWHWC * V*G£ OW

RE: MEDICAL RETORTS AND DOCTOR'S UEN
l do hurebv authorize
SPINE INSTITUTE
to furnish you, my attorney, with a full
report of examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, etc , of myself in regarc to tto ecciaent which I
was recently involved.
I hereby authorize and direct you, my attorney, to pay directly tc said clinic such sums es may bo cue end
owing for meaicai service renderec me both by reason of this evident end by reason of any other bills that
ere due the clinic e^d to witnnoic such Bums from any settlement, judgment or verdict as may be
necessary to edeouateiy protect said ci»mc. And 1 hereby furtner give a Lien on my cese to said clinic
agmnst any and ali proceeds of mv sentemem. judgment or veroc: which may be paid tc you. my attorney,
cr myself, as the result of the Injuries for which I have been treated 01 injuries *r. connection therewith.
i agree never tc rescind tins document and that a rescission will no: be honored by my attorney. I hereby
instruct that m the event another attorney is substituted in this matter, the new attorney honor this lien as
»nr>erem to the settlement ens enforceable upon the case es if it were executec by him
l fully understand tnat I am Erectly and fully resoonsibte tc Mid clinic for oil nodice! bills submitted for
service rencered me anc the: this agreement is made soley lor said clinic's additional protection and in
consideration of awaiting payment. And I further understand that such poymerv; <s not contingent on any
settlement, juogrnent or verd'Ci by when I may eventually recover sale fee.
Please acknowledge this lener by signing oelow and returning to the Spine Institute * have been advised
that rf my anorney does nc: wisn to cooperate in protecting the clinic's interest, the cimic will not await
payment but will recuire me tc make payments on ^-current bask
*
\ A IK. n

^oJiJLy

_ _ _ _ _
_l ^ C
:ure
Patient's Signati
The unce.-signed being aUcne* o- record for the sbcvecp&tieni ooes hereby agree to ooserve a!i the terms
of tne above and agree?; tc withhold Such sums from any settlement, juogrnent, or verdict 8$ may be
necessary tc adecuately protect seid clinic above-named.

Dated

Sjj J06

Attomev's Signature. < ^ ^ - ^ < ^

/

^tf^^^Z^^^^^^

Please sign, date, anc return one copy to Some Institute Also keep one copy for your records
* *. yM P C i iSPLWA*J 1/t/tfO

J K —»* » »~v-<

5— vi HlJl

I

**rv*
Q

630 East 4500 Sou:h, Sulic 300 SaJt Lake City, Utah 84107 (SOI) 265-2700

J.

Addendum D

Assignment of Benefits

To Brian D. Burns, D.C.
aba BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC
ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS
The undersigned patient and/or responsible party, in addition to continuina personal
responsibility, and in consideration of treatment rendered or to be rendered assigns to the
physician or facility named above the following rights, power, and authority:
RELEASED INFORMATION: You are authorized to release and to permit the examination or copvina
of anv of mv medical records, x-ravs. laboratorv reports, and the results of al! tests o?
any type or'character to such person(s) as the physician and/or facility deems appropriate.
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS: You are assigned to exclusive, irrevocable riaht to any cause of
action that exists in my favor aaainst any insurance company or other person or entity to
the extent of your bill for totaT services, includina the exclusive, irrevocable riaht to
receive payment for such services, make aemanc in mv'name for payments, and prosecute anc
receive penalties, interest, court costs, or other legally compensable amounts owea by an
insurance company or other person or entitv.
I, as tfie patient and/or responsible party,
further agree to cooperate, provide information as needed, and appear as needed, wherever to
assist in the prosecution of such claims for benefits upon reauest. The physician anc/or
facility is also assigned the exclusive, irrevocable right to reauest and receive from any
insurance company or health care plan anv and all information and aocuments pertaining to my
policies including a copy of such policv* and any information or suoDortinc documentation
concerning or touching upon the handling, calculation, processing, or payment of any claim.
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT: To anv insurance comoanv providina benefits of any kind to me/us for
treatment renaered by the physician/faci Iitv'named above t you are herepy tendered demand to
pay in full the bill for services rendered by the physician/facility named above following
your receipt of such bill for services to the extent'such bills are'pavaole under the terms
of mv/our bolicv for benefits, less any amounts wnich I/we owe personally which are not
payable under the terms of your policy.
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY:
If patient(s) treatments for injuries are the result of the
nealicence
of
any
third
party,
then patient(s) arant a lien aaainst any recovery from such
tn7rc w party(s) to tne extent of the bills for treatment in favor of the physician/faci I;:y
named above.
STATUTE O F LIMITATIONS: Patient(s) waive the riaht to claim any Statute of Limitations
recarcinc claims for services renaerec cr to be renaered by the pnysician/faciIity namec
above.
ATTORNEY FEES: Patient(s) acrees to pav for reasonable costs of collection (both pre and
post judaement) including attornev fees - and court costs, for services renaerec by tne
pnysiciari/faci I i ty namea above.
LIMITED PCWER OF ATTORNEY:
I hereby arant to the phvsici an/f aci I \ tv named above power :o
enaorse mv name uocn any checks, drafts, or ether negotiable instrument representing payment
from any insurance company representinc payment for treatment and health care renaerec by
phvsician/faciIitv.
i acree that anv Insurance payment representing an amount in excess of
the cnaraes for t^eatmenf rendered will be creciteS to my/our account or forwardec :o my/our
aadress upon reauest in writing to the physician/facility namec above.
In the event that any provision of this Aareement is determined to be invalid or
unenforceacie, all otner provisions of thTs Agreement shall remain enforceable.
A PHOTOCOPY OF THIS INSTRUMENT SHALL SERVE AS ORIGINAL

Date
STATE OF LTAH
Before me this dav personally appeared to oerson(s) w n o s e signature(s) appear above wnc oy
me being duiv sworn upon oatn say(s) tnat the statements set forth aoove are true anc
correct. Subscribed and sworn before me this
cay of
19
Notary Public Salt Lake Countv, Utah
- NOTARY P C S U m
My commission expires
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Addendum E

January 14, 1992 Letter from Defendant Lawrence to
Plaintiff

VICTOR LAWRENCE
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
323 SOUTH 600 EAST, Sum

ISO

SALT LAKE CfTY, UTAH 84102
TELEPHONE (801) 15943600
FAX (802) 521-5731

January 14, 1992
Burns Chiropractic Care
650 East 4500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

84107-2900

Account # 2WAR.13; Account # 2WARJ; John Ward

To Whom It May Concern:
1 have received correspondence in the form of a billing
statement from your office in regard to the above-referenced
accounts for Mr. John Ward.
Please note in your records that my office does not represent
Mr. Ward.
On December 9, 1991 Mr. Ward received a settlement check
payable to him and myself. Evidently there was some confusion as
Mr. Ward's attorney of record, Lowell Summerhays, had withdrawn
and/or erroneously informed the insurance company defendant that
I would be substituting in Mr. Summerhays1 place.
So as not to hold up the settlement I agreed to deposit those
funds in my trust account. When the check cleared my account I
disbursed $1,365.00 to Mr. Summerhays and the entire remaining
balance, $5,135.00 to Mr. Ward. I had no claims for any amounts
because I was not representing Mr. Ward.
I informed Mr. Ward that I could not enter his litigation case
midstream. It was also my understanding that other parties, your
office included, may have asserted liens on those particular funds.
I was not willing to get involved. I endorsed the check because
my name was on it and I had no rights to such funds. I deposited
it in my trust account because I needed to verify that it would
clear before I was willing to release any sums to Mr. Ward or
anyone else.
I did instruct Mr. Ward that if any other party, Mr.
Summerhays, your office, etc., had a lien on any of those funds,
he would be responsible to pay the same and I would be unable to
defend him as to such for the reason stated above; i.e., I am
simply unwilling to enter this case midstream.
If there are any questions or if additional discussion would
be helpful, please call at your earliest convenience.

j i i

(,

Bums Chiropractic Care
January 14, 1992
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